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Why Was the Habsburg Princess Granted the Right to 
Rule the Kingdom of Croatia in 1712?
Th is paper presents the new interpretations of Croatian historiographers concerning 
the so-called Croatian Pragmatic Sanction or Article 7:1712, promulgated by the Sab-
or in March 1712. Th e Sabor’s decision granted the Habsburg female line the succes-
sion right in the Kingdom of Croatia. Our focus has been on answering the question 
why this decision was made in 1712, instead of using the traditional interpretations 
of Croatian narrative historiography. Th e general interpretative context of this paper 
consists of two political trends present in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom 
of Croatia at the beginning of the 18th century: the early modern state-building pro-
cess and the preservation of power of the Sabor elite.
Keywords: Sabor, Croatian Pragmatic Sanction, Habsburg female succession, Lands 
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From historical rights to temporal interests
When in the late 19th and at the turn of the 20th century the Croatian historians 
fi rst wrote analyses of the so-called Croatian Pragmatic Sanction or Article 7: 
1712, promulgated by the Croatian diet, the Sabor, in March 1712,1 those anal-
yses were all about the rights and privileges of the Croatian status et ordines. 
Th eir interpretations were largely guided by two perspectives or arguing points. 
Th e fi rst one concerned the question on what historical right(s) the Croatian no-
bles based their legal and political power to declare the right of Habsburg female 
succession in the Kingdom of Croatia in case the male line became extinct. Th e 
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1 For the text of the Article, see: Zaključci hrvatskog sabora, sv. 2 (1693-1713), ed. Josip Buturac et al. 
(Zagreb: Državni arhiv NR Hrvatske, 1958), Article 7, 471-472.
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second perspective was directed at explaining that all political actions taken in 
order to declare the right of Habsburg female rule stemmed from the political 
confl icts between the Hungarians and the Croatian nobility. It was all instigated 
by the Hungarian nobles, who attacked the rights and privileges of the Croatian 
nobility.2 
Although a legal historical analysis of the so-called Croatian Pragmatic Sanction 
is important, and the existing interpretations could be complemented with some 
new facts and interpretative perspectives, this paper focuses on the question 
“why” and analyses the contemporary socio-political reasons behind the formu-
lation of the legal decision in 1712. Th e main idea is that the Sabor’s decision in 
1712, although based on the historical rights and privileges of the Croatian es-
tates, was a product of the current socio-political situation and personal interests 
of both parties: members of the Habsburg family and the political elite within the 
Kingdom of Croatia. Th e main agenda behind it, concealed under the formula 
of “rights and privileges,” was to preserve the power of the Sabor elite within 
the regional elite network in the slow, but ongoing state-building process of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. When we look at these two processes – state-building and 
the preservation of power for the Sabor elite as the main element for the regional 
elite – then a legal decision such as Article 7:1712 becomes a historiographic story 
telling us who the members of the Sabor elite were and what their domain was, as 
well as how they communicated with the political centre, i.e. the Court of Vien-
na. Th ereby the most interesting part of research is recognizing their overlapping 
interests, where both parties could play with the regional rights and privileges in 
order to accomplish particular political goals.
In its fi rst two sections, this paper aims at presenting the specifi c context, that is, 
the problems which occurred simultaneously yet independently: 
a) to the members of the Habsburg family who were concerned about preserv-
ing the vision of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Danube area, and 
b) to certain members of the Croatian political elite who were concerned about 
the preservation of the existing socio-political reality, in which the Kingdom 
of Croatia (i.e. Zagreb, Varaždin, and Križevci counties) was only within 
their or the Sabor’s scope of infl uence. 
2 For various interpretations in the Croatian historiography, see: Vjekoslav Klaić, “Hrvatska prag-
matička sankcija”, Rad JAZU 206 (1915); Ivan Beuc, “Kojim pravom postaje Marija Terezija hrvatskim 
kraljem?,” Vjesnik Kraljevskog državnog arkiva 8 (1939). As for the Austrian historiography, see: Gu-
stav Turba, Die Grundlagen der Pragmatischen Sanktion I-II (Leipzig; Vienna: F. Deuticke, 1912); Tur-
ba, Die Pragmatische Sanktion. Authentische Texte samt Erläuterungen und Übersetzungen (Vienna, 
1913); Turba, Die pragmatische Sanktion – mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Länder der Stephankrone. 
Neues zur Entstehung und Interpretation 1703-1744 (Vienna, 1906); Turba, Reichsgraf Seilern aus La-
denburg am Neckar 1646-1715 als kurpfälzischer und österreichischer Staatsmann (Heidelberg, 1923).
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Th ese issues motivated the Court of Vienna and the regional elite to create time 
and space for an intense political dialogue on the succession law in the Kingdom 
of Croatia in 1711/1712, as a solution for both parties.
Th e third section analyses the course of the bargaining process between the 
Court of Vienna and the members of the regional elite, naming the main char-
acters in the process, emphasising the infl uence of personal connections in those 
activities, and presenting the fi nal result of the dialogue.
Th e fi nal section poses the following question: did the Sabor elite use the political 
profi t gained by the declaration of the so-called Croatian Pragmatic Sanction for 
achieving the much needed socio-political change in the Kingdom of Croatia in 
the decades aft er 1712? 
Family issues and the state-building process
Th e main problem and trauma for the Habsburg family – and for the dynasty as 
well – was created in 1711, when Joseph I (1705-1711) died without a male succes-
sor. His brother Charles, or Charles III, who was at the time the King of Spain, 
and was in war with France in order to keep his Spanish legacy, was thus forced 
to return to Austria and take over the reins of the Empire and the Austrian Mon-
archy. Th at moment signifi ed the end of the War of the Spanish Succession and 
the loss of the Spanish crown and its territories. Th e only territory the Habsburgs 
were able to keep as part of their Spanish territorial legacy were their Italian and 
Dutch areas.3 Th e main reason for such an outcome for the Austrian House was 
the European powers’ intolerance regarding the possibility of reviving the Uni-
versal Monarchy in Europe, since it had always presented a great disturbance for 
the balance of power, especially in 18th-century Europe. Th e Spanish experience 
showed that Europe had entered into a more distinct phase of its political be-
haviour. Gradually, it was the balance of power and laws that began to shape the 
political map of Europe, rather than family issues. Nevertheless, the aggressive 
politics of the European powers still counted on the biological mishaps of royal 
families in order to extend their territories.4 To avoid the Spanish scenario in the 
Austrian Monarchy, which was not political fi ction, the Habsburg family policies 
preferred to rely on the binding agreements between family members than on bi-
ological luck. In 1703, a family agreement between Leopold I, Joseph, and Charles 
was signed – Pactum mutuae successionis – showing that the Court of Vienna 
3 For a general overview on this subject, see: John P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 169-178.
4 During the 18th century, the European powers were quite oft en involved in diff erent wars of succes-
sion, such as the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1717-
1720), the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), 
and the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-1779).
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did not try to build its future on hopes and expectation. Th e main idea behind 
the agreement was, of course, the right of mutual succession to the Spanish and 
Austrian thrones between Joseph and Charles. Th e novelty was the right of suc-
cession for the female line, and Joseph’s daughters had precedence.5 Th e agree-
ment was kept secret from the European powers because there was a possibility 
that mutual succession might unite the Spanish and Austrian crowns under one 
family member, which would lead to the revival of the much-hated Universal 
Monarchy in Europe. On the other hand, the end of the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession made Central Europe, i.e. the Empire and the Hungarian lands, to the 
Habsburgs’ key territories, the real base of their future power and their status as a 
European power. Th e foundation of dynastic power in these “Eastern parts” was 
the Habsburgs’ hereditary and elective right to rule, but only for the male mem-
bers of the family. Th e Habsburg female succession right met with serious legal 
obstacles in those parts, and so did the Habsburg supremacy.
In the Empire, for example, due to the Salic law, women could not be elected 
as empresses. In case of the Habsburg female succession, only a King-Consort 
could be Emperor. Marriage connections with the Empire were not a novelty for 
the Habsburgs. Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI all married princesses from 
the Empire as a means to strengthen the Habsburgs’ status in the Empire.6 Aft er 
1703, when the Habsburg female succession became a possible reality, the fu-
ture King-Consort to the Habsburg heiress apparent, or heiress presumptive, and 
thus the future Emperor, had to be someone unquestionably loyal to the interests 
of the Habsburg family. Th e choice of the bridegroom depended on the ambi-
tions and infl uence of his native family in the Empire and their willingness to 
cooperate with the Habsburgs.7
In 1711, the situation became complicated. Joseph I died and Charles VI, as the 
last living male member of the Habsburg family, who moreover lived in a quite 
unstable social environment, such as the one marking the beginning of the 18th 
century, felt the pressure to make the Pactum publicly known. Th e Habsburg 
female succession was a huge legal decision, which could have been implemented 
only with the estates’ approval. Th e dormant ambitions of the Empire estates 
and the Court of Vienna were awakened. Court and family factions were created 
immediately aft er Joseph’s death: the widowed queen Amalie Wilhelmine, with 
5 For a detailed description and analysis of the Pactum, see: Turba Grundlagen II, 136-157. For the 
text of the Pactum, see: Turba Grundlagen II, 372-392.
6 Teodor Athlet Heinrich Strattmann, the Court of Vienna Minister from 1683 to 1693, is regarded 
as the founder of this marriage policy. See Constantin Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kai-
serthums Osterreich I. (Vienna: Verlag der Universitäts-Buchdruckerei von L. C. Zamarski, 1856), 
309-312.
7 Charles W. Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy (West Lafay-
ette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1979), 31-77.
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a strong support of her native family Brunswick-Lüneburg from the Empire, on 
the one side, and the queen mother and regent Eleonore on the other. Th eir con-
fl icts regarding the order of precedence in court ceremonies and their political 
connections with various court ministers and deputies created the possibility of 
a great crisis at the Court of Vienna.8 In order to prevent such court and family 
factions, which were expected to intensify following the publication of the Pac-
tum, Charles wrote his political testament before he left  Spain in September 1711, 
as the main document ensuring the succession order in the family.
Although inspired by the Pactum, Charles’ testament ensured precedence in line 
of succession for his own future children, both male and female. One should also 
consider this decision as a means of crisis control and an expression of his royal 
authority. His testament remained secret for the same reason as the Pactum was 
until 1713, when he declared it a Pragmatic Sanction.9 So, the situation in the Em-
pire regarding a potential female successor was serious. However, the Hungarian 
legal obstacle to the Habsburg female succession was far more dangerous for the 
process of keeping the core territories in Central Europe under the Habsburgs.
As for the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, or the so called Hungarian Lands, 
i.e. Hungary, Croatia and Transylvania, the key legal problem for the Habsburgs 
was the legally valid Article 3:1687 of the common Diet of Hungary. Activation 
of this article meant the restoration of the right of free election of the king to 
the Croatian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian estates in case of extinction of the 
male Habsburg line.10 From the Habsburg perspective of Charles VI being the 
last living male member of the Habsburg family, this article presented a great 
political threat. In the worst-case scenario for the Habsburgs, activation of this 
article could create room for the election of any male or female member of the 
Habsburg family (if this family at all) as the future common Hungarian king. 
Th eoretically speaking, Article 3:1687 could again start a game of thrones within 
the monarchy and threaten the Habsburg supremacy in the area. However, spec-
ulations about female succession had been present in the monarchical public long 
before 1711.11 Hungary was no diff erent. For example, in 1706 Ferenc Rákóczi, the 
leader of the rebellion against the Habsburg rule in Hungary from 1705 to 1711, 
wrote: “For what reason does the House of Austria wish to acquire Transylvania 
8 Hildegard Leitgeb, “Kaiserin Amalie Wilhemine, geb Prinzessin von Braunschweig-Lüne-
burg-Hannover (1673-1742), Gemahlin Kaiser Josephs I. Eine biographische Studie” (Doctoral dis-
sertation, University of Vienna, 1984), 169; Alfred Arneth, “Eigenhändige Correspondenz des Königs 
Karl III. von Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI.) mit dem Obersten Kanzler des Königreiches Böh-
men, Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw,” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte 16 (1856): 153.
9 For a detailed description and analysis of Charles’ political testament, see: Turba, Grundlagen II, 
173-179.
10 “Articulus 3” in Corpus decretorum Juris Ungarici, vol. II (Budae: 1847), 65.
11 Leitgeb, “Kaiserin Amalie Wilhelmine”, 146-147.
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by force of arms, if not to consolidate its power, indeed, its very foundation? It is 
easy to see why some ministers would rather have their hands cut off  than allow 
the country to separate. Obviously, the House of Austria anticipates a shortcom-
ing on the male line, in which case the female line could keep Hungary bridled 
by way of Transylvania.”12 Th e reason for “keeping Hungary bridled” was the 
above-mentioned Article 3:1687. As a politician, Rákóczi expected the Habsburgs 
to apply their politics of particularism within the Hungarian lands as the main 
tool for obstructing the unanimity and consensus between the Hungarian, Croa-
tian, and Transylvanian estates regarding the succession right. However, as much 
as the Habsburgs were afraid of the legal return of free election of the king to the 
Hungarian, Croatian, and Transylvanian estates, which would have undoubted-
ly presented the main obstacle to the Habsburg absolutism in the Hungarian 
lands, a part of the Hungarian political elite was afraid of any kind of destruc-
tion of St Stephan’s Crown’s political structure as the base of political power in 
the Hungarian lands within the Austrian Monarchy. So, during Charles’ return 
trip from Spain, which lasted for nine months, his mother Eleonore ruled over 
the Austrian Monarchy. Well aware of all the problems regarding the succession 
rights within the Empire and the Hungarian Lands, she turned to the latter as 
the solution to the problem. However, not concerning the rights and privileges 
of the Transylvanian estates, as Rákóczi had expected, but to the estates in the 
Kingdom of Croatia. Since the right to elect the king was their municipal right, 
and the Sabor was the place to promulgate such a fundamental law, Regent Ele-
onore decided to choose some members of the Croatian estates as her partners in 
“bridling” Hungary regarding the female succession right. Whom to choose was 
not a diffi  cult task. Croatian political community was highly confl icted at the 
beginning of the 18th century, torn between diff erent fractions, each one trying 
to prevail in obtaining or keeping political power on a regional level. Th is gave 
Vienna an opportunity to interfere and choose certain members of the regional 
elite, infl uential in the Sabor, as partners in solving the succession right problem. 
Th e fact that the Croatian political community as a whole “once upon a time had 
the right to choose their own kings and could not be forced to accept the Hungar-
ian kings if not willing to do so”13 served as a mere instrument in a very gradual 
and sophisticated state-building process of the Court of Vienna in the Danube 
area. However, this process was underway owing to the cooperation between the 
political centre and the regional elite. Th e regional elite had its local interests and 
for the Sabor elite the Monarchy was just a means and a frame to keep the local 
12 Ágnes R. Várkony, “Th e Last Decades of the Independent Principality (1660-1711),” in: History of 
Transylvania, Volume II. From 1606 to 1830, ed. Béla Köpeczi (New Jersey: Atlantic Research and Pub-
lication Inc., 2001-2002), htto://mek.oszk.hu/03400/03407/html/256.html (last accessed on January 5, 
2018).
13 Hrvoje Matković, Na vrelima hrvatske povijesti (Zagreb: Golden marketing and Tehnička knjiga 
2006), 136.
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aff airs in their own domain of infl uence. Every king or queen who was willing to 
take that into account was acceptable. 
Family issues and the regional elite networks
A general historiographic conclusion or explanation of the reasons why Arti-
cle 7:1712 was promulgated by the Sabor in 1712 can be found in the general 
Croatian-Hungarian confl ict of 1708, which marked “the beginning of a centu-
ries-long strife” between the two political communities, which would reach its 
pinnacle in the second half of the 19th century.14 However, when we return to the 
sources there is no strong evidence to support this thesis. Th e “1708 confl ict” was 
neither general nor Croatian-Hungarian. So, what did actually happen in 1708? 
A large dispute took place in 1708 during the session of the common Diet of 
Hungary in Pozsony, but only between certain members of the Croatian po-
litical elite. At the session of the Lower House, Juraj Erdődy, Gabrijel Erdődy, 
and Adam Keglević15 self-willingly proposed the so called “Erdődy’s gravami-
na” without the consent of the Sabor or its representatives (nuncii), Juraj Plemić 
and Petar Gotal.16 Th e most problematic demands of Erdődy’s party presented a 
serious limitation to the Sabor’s authority: for example, the demand for the uni-
formity of Croatian and Hungarian laws or the reduction in the jurisdiction of 
the Sabor’s offi  cials, such as the Vice-Ban (also the Count of Zagreb and Križevci) 
and the Prothonotary from the ranks of the lesser nobles.17 Prothonotary Plemić 
and Vice-Ban Jelačić protested severely. Neither the king nor the common Diet of 
Hungary accepted “Erdődy’s gravamina.” Th e Palatine and the Ban stayed out of 
14 We do not know whom to consider as the founder of this thesis, but since Klaić’s interpretation of 
the so-called Croatian Pragmatic Sanction of 1912, it has been generally accepted among the Croatian 
historians. Cf. Klaić, “Hrvatska pragmatička sankcija,” 75-76. However, in the historiographic work 
on the Pragmatic Sanction in the Hungarian historiography at the beginning of the 20th century, there 
is no mention of a “general confl ict” between the Croatian and the Hungarian nobility in 1708. See 
István Csekey, A magyar trónköröklési jog. Jogtörténelmi és közjogi tanulmány oklevélmellékletekkel 
(Budapest, 1917), 283-300.
15 Th e Erdődy brothers were landlords in both the Kingdom of Croatia and the Kingdom of Hungary 
and therefore enjoyed the rights and privileges of both kingdoms. Adam Keglević was at that time 
the Treasurer of the Kingdom of Croatia. Th ey were called “attackers of the Croatian rights and priv-
ileges” in Hrvatske kraljevinske konferencije, sv.1 (1689.-1716.), ed. Josip Barbarić et al. (Zagreb: Arhiv 
Hrvatske, 1985), 279.
16 Nuncii, the offi  cial representatives of the Sabor, were the only ones allowed to speak in the name 
of the Kingdom of Croatia at the sessions of the common Diet of Hungary; cf. Ivan Beuc, Povijest in-
stitucija državne vlasti kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet, Centar za 
stručno usavršavanje i suradnju s udruženim radom, 1985), 198-200.
17 Th e text of “Erdődy’s gravamina” has been published in Eugen Valdec, “Hrvatska u doba bune 
Franje II. Rákóczya” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Zagreb, 1943), 90-93.
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this confl ict,18 but the strife between the above-mentioned personalities contin-
ued and would spread throughout the Croatian political community in the years 
to come. Th e community of the three counties under the Sabor’s administration 
was caught in the net of these two fractions, led by the Erdődys on the one side 
and the Sabor’s offi  cials – especially the Prothonotary – on the other. Th e reason 
why the Erdődys insisted on their “anti-Croatian-rights” policy can be found 
in their socio-political ambitions, running much deeper than their infl uence in 
the Kingdom of Croatia. Th e Erdődy family was aspiring to become a member 
of the exclusive monarchical elite circle originating from the Hungarian lands, 
like the Pálff y or the Esterházy families. Th e opportunity to become one of the 
richest and most infl uential families in the Hungarian lands presented itself in 
1704, when the last member of the Croatian branch of the Erdődy family died. 
Th e surviving Hungarian branch of the family inherited the hereditary title of 
the Counts of Varaždin and the Croatian estates. Th e integrated family property 
was a huge asset, but the estates were under two legal jurisdictions: the Croatian 
and the Hungarian. Already in 1889 Bidermann mentioned that some steps were 
taken by the Erdődy family to legally integrate the Erdődys’ estate in Varaždin 
County with those in Hungary, in order to avoid legal subjection to the laws and 
jurisdiction of the Sabor.19 We have good reasons to follow Bidermann’s thoughts 
on this matter. Aft er 1700s, the Erdődys were constantly involved in legal dis-
putes with diff erent personalities in the Kingdo m of Croatia. Th e Erdődy family 
also had problems with the only living member of the Croatian branch, Dora 
Barbara, who was married to Th eodor Auersperg. She and her husband sued the 
Erdődys, probably over the ownership rights over a part of the Croatian estates.20 
Th is lawsuit seems to have been a never-ending story, and it was not the only 
one. Another strife, regarding the Erdődys’ leasing rights on the copper mines 
of Samobor, shed a diff erent light on the context of the 1708 confl ict between 
the Erdődys and the Sabor elite. It is important to mention, however, that at the 
time of these court processes, Ban Ivan Pálff y was constantly absent from the 
Kingdom of Croatia, since he was the commander-in-chief against the Rákóczi 
rebellions (1703-1711). It was customary in those times for the jurisdiction to be 
passed on the Sabor’s offi  cials, such as the Vice-Ban or the Prothonotary:21 the 
very same offi  cials whom the Erdődys attacked in 1708. So, were they attack-
18 For a detailed analysis of the 1708 confl ict, see: Ivana Jukić and Josip Kasalo, “Kraljevinska pra-
va, kraljevinska elita: primjer protonotara Jurja Plemića (1690.-1713.)”, Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne 
znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti 34 (2016): 
139-142.
19 Herman Ignaz Bidermann, Geschichte der österreichischen Gesamt-Staats-Idee 1526-1804 (Inns-
bruck, 1889), 242.
20 Ivana Jukić, Hrvatska pragmatička sankcija: cum Regi, tum Patriae (Doctoral dissertation, Univer-
sity of Zagreb, 2009), 172, n. 378.
21 Beuc, Povijest institucija, 204-208.
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ing them as the only way of marginalizing the infl uence of those who were on 
the leading positions in the Sabor, in order to accomplish their interests in the 
Kingdom of Croatia? Th e story about the Samobor copper mines might help us 
answer this question.
Since 1654, the Samobor copper mines had been owned by the Auersperg family 
and in 1696, the Auerspergs decided to lease them. Th ey were considering some 
noblemen from Styria and informed the Sabor on their plans through the Con-
ference.22 A small group of offi  cials recognized the notifi cation as a great business 
opportunity for the Kingdom as a whole. From 1696 to 1698, some kind of prepa-
rations took place: the Sabor “hired” Michael Androka, a Croatian nobleman, to 
prepare the lease contract with the Auersperg and to run the business in his and 
their names as well. However, some members of the Sabor elite, such as Protho-
notary Plemić, Vice-Ban Jelačić, etc. established the “Samobor Copper Mines 
Society” at the same time, with the aim of defi ning the contract terms between 
Androka and the Sabor elite. Androka soon fell into serious problems with the 
Auerspergs and at the end of 1698 decided to sell his leasing rights to a third party 
in order to pay his debt to the family. Th e Sabor elite wanted to be that third party 
and thus started collecting money to pay off  the Auerspergs. However, they only 
succeeded to collect the down payment, which the Auerspergs declined. Instead, 
they gave a 50-year leasing right over the Samobor mines to the Erdődys. Th is 
was the beginning of a long-lasting dispute over the unsolved question of the 
main leaseholder of the Samobor copper mines.23 In this intricate net of interests, 
legal jurisdiction, and basically chaos, the Erdődys attempted to break the Sabor 
elite network by attacking the legal jurisdiction of the Sabor and those offi  ces and 
offi  cials within the Sabor whom they saw as the major obstacles to the rise of the 
family’s economic  and political power. 
Th e crisis of 1708 showed to the Sabor elite that, if they wanted to preserve their 
socio-political supremacy within the Kingdom of Croatia, they needed a law 
which would demonstrate once and for all the legal autonomy of the Kingdom 
of Croatia within the Hungarian Lands and the Monarchy. Th e opportunity to 
achieve this goal presented itself in 1711/1712, when the Court of Vienna, via 
a member of the monarchical elite, proposed a political deal to the Sabor elite: 
they would get what they wanted in return for the female succession right in the 
Kingdom of Croatia. So, in 1712 the Sabor proclaimed Article 7:1712 and the 
female succession right. In return, in 1715 they had Article 120:1715 approved by 
the King at the common Diet of Hungary, which guaranteed legal autonomy of 
the Kingdom of Croatia “for all times.”24 And the Erdődys? Eventually they did 
22 On the Conference of the Kingdom of Croatia, see: Beuc, Povijest institucija, 195.
23 For a detailed analysis of the role of the Samobor copper mines in the relations between the Erdődys 
and the Sabor elite, see: Jukić and Kasalo, “Kraljevinska prava”, 136-139.
24 “Articulus 120”, Corpus decretorum Juris Ungarici, 109.
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become members of the monarchical elite, but had neither a chance to become 
the most infl uential elite in the Kingdom, nor to marginalize the infl uence of the 
Sabor elite in the fi rst half of the 18th century. Th at task was left  to Charles VI and 
Maria Th eresa, as the major challenge during their state-building process in the 
Kingdom of Croatia.
So, who were the people from the Court of Vienna, the monarchical and the 
Sabor elites, who were in charge of the political deal and dialogue in 1711/1712?
Th e mediators in crisis management
For the Habsburgs, the creation of the monarchy meant building a state based 
on close collaboration between their court and the chosen members of the mo-
narchical elite, who were well integrated in the regional elites. Th is “diarchy” 
remained the keystone of the Habsburgs’ politics throughout the Monarchy.25 
Th e Kingdom of Croatia was no exception. From the 1670s, the diarchy partner 
in Croatia was usually either the Ban or the Bishop of Zagreb. One of the many 
problems in 1708 was that no diarchy partner was physically present in Croatia 
as a mediator between the Habsburg Court and the regional elite. Th e Ban of 
Croatia, Ivan Pálff y, as a member of the monarchical elite, could and should have 
served the purpose; however, he was constantly absent from the Kingdom due to 
the previously mentioned role in suppressing the Rákóczi rebellion. Th e Bishop 
of Zagreb, Martin Brajković, died in June 1708. Political instability in the King-
dom of Croatia at the time of the Rákóczi rebellion (1705-1711) could present a 
considerable socio-political threat to the Monarchy in its Eastern parts. So, to 
avoid that situation, in 1708, Joseph I made a smart pro-monarchical move using 
his centuries-old ius patronatus in the Hungarian Lands, i.e. the right to install 
ecclesiastical dignitaries. He appointed Emerik Esterházy as the new bishop of 
Zagreb, a well-known member of the Hungarian noble family that was, besides 
the Pálff ys, the most infl uential supporter of the Habsburg politics in the Hun-
garian lands. Th e new mediator between the Court of Vienna and the Croatian 
elite was thus successfully installed.
Emerik Esterházy’s name was not a novelty in the Croatian political community. 
He had already lived in Remete near Zagreb as member of the Pauline Order. 
In 1701, he even became the head of the order. Th e new bishop was also well ac-
25 For an overview of the term “diarchy”, see Th omas Winkelbauer, “Krise der Aristokratie? Zum 
Strukturwandel des Adels in den böhmischen und niederösterreichischen Ländern im 16. und 17. 
Jahrhundert”, Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 100 (1992): 329; Jeroen 
Duindam, Myths of Power: Norbert Elias and the Early Modern European Court (Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press 1994), 66-74.
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quainted with the socio-political situation in the Kingdom of Croatia.26 His role 
as the Bishop of Zagreb was of great political importance, because in the times 
when the Ban was absent, presidency over the Sabor was transferred to the Bish-
op of Zagreb as the locumtenens banalis. At fi rst, Bishop Esterházy was not well 
accepted among the Sabor elite, but very soon his socio-political conduct proved 
that he was well prepared for the new role. His infi ltration in the regional elite 
started in the Sabor and among the Sabor’s offi  cials, whom he chose as prime 
partners in regulating political life in the Kingdom of Croatia. His most confi -
dential partner was Prothonotary Plemić, although according to Patačić’s diary, 
in 1708 Esterházy did not have his support in the election for the new bishop of 
Zagreb. Also, the Prothonotary was not on good terms with the Ban of Croatia, 
Ivan Pálff y, who was a close confi dant and friend of Bishop Esterházy.27 However, 
the new bishop was well aware of who controlled the Sabor and who was the most 
infl uential political fi gure among the Sabor elite. So, the Bishop’s infl uence as the 
head of the Sabor during Ban Pálff y’s absence was highly dependent on the help 
of the Prothonotary. Even his colleague, chosen to deal with the military matters 
in the Ban’s name, the banalis locumentatis in militaris Petar Keglević, although 
respected in the Sabor, had little control over their actions.28 Esterházy did not 
stop his infi ltration process into the Sabor elite. Th e Bishop’s other partners were 
members of the nobility, since they were not at that moment in the position to be-
come members of the monarchical elite, such as Count Ivan Drašković or Franjo 
Delišimunović. However, they were well integrated in the Sabor elites. Esterházy 
also communicated with the Erdődys, yet stayed out of their circle and actions.29 
Although he recognized at once where the real power lay and whom to choose as 
partners to restore balance in Croatian political life, he did not have a solution to 
the problem of how to restore at least an illusion of political balance within the 
Kingdom of Croatia. An opportunity for that appeared unexpectedly at the end 
of 1711, when Regent Eleonore invited the Bishop to come urgently to Vienna to 
discuss a subject that was very important to His Majesty, Charles VI, and would 
benefi t the common Hungarian Kingdom as well.30 
26 For additional biographical information on Emerik Esterházy, see Ivana Jukić, “Istražni postupak 
zagrebačkog biskupa Emerika Esterházya godine 1708. – poimanje suvremenika o biskupovoj osob-
nosti i slika stanja biskupije”, Povijesni prilozi 23 (2004), br. 26: 136-140.
27 Ivan Kukuljević-Sakcinski, “Zapisci barona Baltazara Patačića i grofa Adama Oršića od god. 1691-
1814.”, Arkiv za povjestnicu jugoslavensku 10 (1869): 235-237.
28 For additional details on Petar Keglević, see: Ivana Jukić, “Zagrebački biskup Emerik Esterházy i 
čl. 7./Hrvatska pragmatička sankcija iz 1712.” (MA thesis, University of Zagreb, 2005), 116-128.
29 Th is conclusion has been reached based on  the research and analysis of the letters kept at the 
Archdiocesan Archive in Zagreb, Epistolae ad episcopos, vol. 54-58; cf. Klaić, “Hrvatska pragmatička 
sankcija”, 65-73.
30 Th e letter has been published in Ivana Jukić, “Vladavina žena na Bečkom dvoru 1711./1712. i Hr-
vatska pragmatička sankcija”, Povijesni prilozi 24 (2006), br. 30: 125-126.
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Th e Queen mother, Eleonore, acted as the regent of the Monarchy in Charles’ 
name from April 1711 until March 1712, during the time of his return journey 
from Barcelona to Vienna. Judging by their correspondence and the correspon-
dence of the court minister Wratislaw with Charles, it became obvious that the 
King planned to rule the Hungarian lands “in the same manner” as the other 
parts of his Austrian Monarchy. Eleonore knew it would be a political suicide, es-
pecially on the eve of the publication of Charles’ last will, and expected a political 
dialogue between Charles and the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen on the 
female succession right matter. Unlike her son, she understood the socio-polit-
ical habits of the Hungarian Lands much better.31 Th e most dangerous political 
scenario for the Habsburgs was fi rm unanimity in all the three Hungarian Lands 
regarding Article 3:1687. As I have mentioned before, the Hungarian political 
public feared that Vienna might use the rights and privileges of the Transylva-
nian nobility as a way of sabotaging or bridling this pre-assumed unanimity.32 
However, Eleonore did not choose to use the rights and privileges of the Tran-
sylvanian nobility to control the power of Article 3:1687; instead, she chose the 
Croatian nobility. What inspired her to do so? Th ere are several explanations to 
this. Firstly, it was a custom, before a new diet was summoned in Pozsony, for the 
ruler or their confi dants to read the scripts and diaries of the previous ones as the 
guidelines and preparation work for the upcoming session.33 Th e diet summoned 
in April 1712 was a continuation of the session of 1708 and a signifi cant episode 
was recorded in its diary: an attack on the rights of the Kingdom of Croatia and 
a great confl ict between the two factions of the Croatian nobility.34 Did this give 
her an idea and a chance for arbitration? Secondly, the Bishop of Zagreb was a 
member of the Esterházy family. Th is family had played a major role in the rec-
ognition of the Habsburg hereditary right in the Lands of the Crown of Saint 
Stephen in 1687, especially due to the intercession of Emerik’s uncle, Palatine 
Pal Esterházy. It can be assumed that Eleonore may have communicated about 
sensitive matters, such as the female succession right, with a member of such a 
family. Th irdly, the personal physician of Regent Eleonore in 1679 was Ivan Krs-
titelj Alpuno, whose medical career began in the Kingdom of Croatia, so he may 
have been the source of information regarding the socio-political situation in 
31 Jukić, “Vladavina žena”, 110-114.
32 See n. 12.
33 Petr Mat’a, “Landstände und Landtage in den böhmischen und österreichischen Ländern (1620-
1740). Von der Niedergangsgeschichte zur Interaktionsanalyse”, in: Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 
bis 1740, Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas, ed. Th omas Winkelbauer and Petr 
Mat‘a (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), 364.
34 National and University Library Zagreb, Acta et diaria diaetarum regni Hungariae ab anno 1708 
ad annum 1765 celebratum, R 3198/3, 67-86.
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Croatia.35 Whatever motivated her to initiate the communication with the Bish-
op of Zagreb and to use the rights and privileges of the Croatian status et ordines 
to monarchical benefi t, she instigated it on November 17, 1711 by sending an 
invitation letter to Bishop Esterházy. Th e Bishop travelled to Vienna and the rest 
is history (or mystery?).36 
What we do know is that upon his return to Zagreb, between February and 
March 1712, the Bishop shared the idea of the Habsburg female succession right 
with several confi dential and infl uential people, such as Prothonotary Plemić, 
Petar Keglević, and Baltazar Patačić.37 It seems that most of them were sceptical. 
However, on March 9, 1712, aft er Prothonotary Plemić gave a very convincing 
speech regarding the Croatian rights and privileges, the Sabor declared the right 
of the Habsburg female rule over Croatia.38 
Th is decision was a gem, set and match for the Habsburgs against the pre-assumed 
fi rm unanimity of the Hungarian lands, i.e. Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania 
regarding Article 3:1687. However, this political dialogue with the Sabor elite in 
1711/1712 was just one additional step in building the Habsburgs’ particularistic 
politics in the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen. Aft er 1687, the ruler was 
no longer just a binding element in that political structure, but the creator of its 
character as well. Th e disintegration of the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen 
was not the goal; instead, the particularistic politics was a means to establish 
the ruler’s supremacy. Firstly, in 1691, Leopold I declared the Diploma Leopold-
inum to the Transylvanian nobility, granting them an autonomous status in the 
Hungarian lands and a direct line for political dialogues with Vienna. Aft er the 
Sabor’s decision in March 1712, and aft er Charles VI confi rmed Article 120:1715, 
the same status was granted to the Kingdom of Croatia. However, in order to 
continue the policy of compromise and to calm down the restless political spirits 
in Hungary who were expecting a complete dissolution of the political structure 
of St Stephen’s Crown, in 1715 Charles VI confi rmed Article 3:1715, which pre-
vented such dissolution.39 Th ere were no objections from Croatia or Transylvania 
as neither of them had a problem with being a part of the Crown as long as their 
autonomy was safeguarded by the abovementioned legal decisions. When in 1722 
the Habsburg female succession right was on schedule at the common Diet of 
Hungary, the entire Hungarian political community unanimously and uncondi-
tionally accepted the female succession right. However, the Court of Vienna had 
the upper hand once again. Th is time, the demand for the legal indivisibility of 
35 Biserka Belicza, “Medicina i zdravstvo”, in: Hrvatska i Europa. Kultura, znanost i umjetnost. Svezak 
III. Barok i prosvjetiteljstvo (XVII-XVIII. stoljeće), ed. Ivan Golub (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2003), 380.
36 See n. 30.
37 Ivana Jukić, “Zagrebački biskup Emerik Esterházy”, 108-136.
38 For the text of the speech, see Klaić, “Hrvatska pragmatička sankcija”, 79-81.
39 “Articulus 3”, Corpus decretorum Juris Ungarici, 78-79.
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the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephan, fi rst postulated in Article 3:1715, was 
supplemented with a new condition: the indivisibility of the Lands of the Crown 
of Saint Stephan was for all times conditioned upon their inseparability from the 
Monarchy. Breaking up with the Monarchy meant breaking the laws in Articles 
2:1723 and 3:1723.40 
Th erefore, the Sabor’s decision of 1712 played a signifi cant role in keeping Hun-
gary “bridled” regarding the female succession right. Did the Croatian status et 
ordines use this political deal to strengthen their position or role in the Austrian 
Monarchy?
Legacy of Article 7:1712 – An opportunity missed?
Th e demands of the Croatian status et ordines in 1712 were not modest if we 
analyse them in the context of the state-building process. Luckily for historians, 
those demands were written down by Bishop Esterházy in a letter he sent in May 
1712 to Court Minister Johann Friedrich von Seilern, in the form of an appeal to 
the Minister to grant an audience to Prothonotary Plemić. Th e letter was a sort 
of information sheet for Seilern, fi lled with facts that would be presented to him 
by the Prothonotary as the demands of the Croatian status et ordines in return 
for the acceptance of the Habsburg female succession in the Kingdom of Croatia. 
Th ose demands were summarized by the bishop and are given here in six points:
1) Th e public announcement regarding the Croatian taxes, which were accepted 
in compliance with the king’s will; 
2) Th e Varaždin Generalate was to be preserved; 
3) However, under the jurisdiction of the Sabor;
4) Th e Sabor’s right to name the Vice-Ban;
5) Th e jurisdiction was to remain in the Kingdom and in the Ban’s hands;
6) All laws passed in the Sabor were to be re-examined and confi rmed by the 
king.41 
Vienna accepted everything except for the demand regarding the Varaždin Gen-
eralate. Strengthening the military power of the regional elite was a bit too much 
to allow in the process of building an early modern European state.42 However, 
40 “Articulus 2” and “Articulus 3”, Corpus decretorum Juris Ungarici, 118-119.
41 Th e letter was published in Turba, Reichsgraf Seilern, 326, n. 1164.
42 From 1702 onwards, the Croatian estates communicated intensively with the Court of Vienna re-
garding the question of returning the Varaždin Generalate under the jurisdiction of the Sabor. For 
details see: Lidija Cerić, “Varaždinski generalat u službi apsolutističkih težnji Bečkoga dvora”, Povi-
jesni prilozi 28 (2009), br. 36: 118-125.
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all legal, administrative, and judicial power in the three counties and the Banate 
Border remained in the hands of the Sabor. Th is was political success with a great 
potential to start the unavoidable socio-political integration in the Monarchy on 
Croatia’s own terms, at its own pace, and for it to be regarded as a regional ini-
tiative. However, this opportunity was missed. When in 1755 a massive peasant 
rebellion broke out in Croatia, the passive, counterproductive, and malcontent 
behaviour of the Sabor elite came to the surface. Maria Th eresa summoned a 
commission to investigate the causes of the rebellion, with Count Michael Al-
than as its head. As the key problems in Banate Croatia he pointed out the fol-
lowing: the accumulation of political power in the hands of a few offi  cials, the in-
effi  ciency of the Sabor, and the lack of respect for the King’s or Ban’s authority.43 
All the conclusions revealed the presence of forces that were highly destructive 
for the state-building process and for Maria Th eresa’s reforms. From then on, the 
political decisions of the Court of Vienna were directed towards the exclusion of 
the Sabor and its elite from any administrative business.
Th e opportunity for the Sabor elite to use the political potential created by the 
1712 political deal in order to initiate socio-political changes in central Croatia 
and become the co-creators of high politics in long term was lost. However, poor 
daily politics could not destroy the best legacy of the 1712-1715 generation of the 
Sabor elite: Article 120:1715, i.e. legal autonomy. Perhaps this was the highest 
possible achievement of this regional elite in the art of politics infl uenced by the 
early modern state-building process.
43 Ivana Horbec, “Razvoj uprave i javnih službi Banske Hrvatske u vrijeme vladavine Marije Terezije” 
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Zagreb, 2009), 153.
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Ivana Jukić *
Zašto je habsburškoj princezi odobreno pravo vladanja Hrvatskim 
Kraljevstvom 1712. godine?
Sažetak
U radu se iznose nova tumačenja hrvatskih povjesničara o tzv. Hrvatskoj pragmatičkoj 
sankciji ili članku 7. odluka Hrvatskog sabora donesenom u ožujku 1712. godine, koji-
me se odobrava ženskoj liniji dinastije Habsburg pravo na nasljeđivanje u Hrvatskom 
Kraljevstvu. Umjesto korištenja tradicionalnih tumačenja ove odluke, kakvu je dono-
sila hrvatska narativna historiografi ja, autorica težište stavlja na pitanje zašto je odluka 
donesena upravo 1712. godine. Pri tome se opći, interpretativni kontekst istraživanja 
sastoji od prikaza i analize ranomodernog procesa izgradnje države s jedne i očuvanja 
moći saborske elite s druge strane, kao dva najznačajnija politička kretanja prisutna u 
Habsburškoj Monarhiji i Kraljevini Hrvatskoj početkom 18. stoljeća. 
Ključne riječi: Sabor, Hrvatska pragmatična sankcija, nasljeđivanje dinastije Habsburg 
po ženskoj liniji, zemlje krune Sv. Stjepana, 18. stoljeće
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